

“A discovery is said to be an accident meeting a prepared mind.”

Albert Szent-Gyorgyi

“Spectacular achievement is always preceded by unspectacular preparation.”

Robert H. Schuller

© 2022 Foothill Services Nevada Inc. All Rights Reserved. **Warning:** Burrrito reading may be hazardous to your health, such as rational thinking, and other related diseases. The Burrrito contains the personal views of Gary Ackerman and does not reflect the views of any other person or organization. The material is intended for adults, including the humor. If you are offended by the humor, then don't read the Burrrito. Alternatively, you can subscribe for a Meatless Burrrito that eliminates the Below the Belt section by sending me an [email](#). A history of the Western Power Trading Forum (WPTF) including a section on the evolution of the Friday Burrrito can be found by clicking [here](#).

It was monsoon season in Southern California last weekend. Not in all parts but enough locally to water my lawn ... for the next month. The Sunday Houston-style deluge dropped 2.2" of rain in 90 minutes in a region that on average receives 18.1" per year. I was overjoyed watching the water gush off our roof like Niagara or Iguazu Falls. Twenty-five miles east of us there was nary a drop. These storm cells popped up in various places, outgrowths of an offshore tropical storm that invaded the Southwest from Mexico and restored parched plant life, cleansed the air, and brought much needed temperature relief.

I need to make a correction from last week's Burrrito. I stated that the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES) issued a text-message on two days last week alerting millions of individuals to reduce electricity consumption ... Tuesday, September 6 and Wednesday, September 7. That was wrong. The OES alert went out only on Tuesday. Learning that small fact made a huge difference in my estimate of the associated load-reduction impact from 1,500 MW to about 600 MW because I suddenly had a superior base line comparison using Wednesday when there wasn't an alert and daytime temperatures were very similar to Tuesday's. Initially, I used last Labor Day Monday as my base line which was a flawed comparison but at the time I didn't believe I had a better alternative.


**Western States Playbook**

*CAISO YTD Renewables Curtailment:*  
 As of 7/31: 2,161,235 MWh  
 % of potential solar and wind output curtailed:  
 YTD as of July, 2022 6.14%  
 YTD as of July, 2021 3.34%

*CAISO Stakeholder Symposium:* Wednesday November 9 and Thursday November 10 at the Safe Credit Union Convention Center in Sacramento. For more details [click here](#).

*WPTF on LinkedIn:* Follow the group on LinkedIn by clicking [here](#).

A visual comparison helps one grasp this fact. For both days I downloaded the five-minute demand intervals starting at 17:55 because the text alert was issued just minutes before. I calculated the change in demand for



each of the 12 intervals. It was interesting to me that the OES message seemed to have a very significant impact for two or so intervals and then taper off. I think a 600 MW cost free near-instantaneous load reduction from a single emergency text message is pretty damn impressive. Of course, the Gov boosted the number to 2,600 MW by citing the reduction in gross demand most of which also happened on Wednesday without any help from the OES. Our home didn't respond to the alert since we always keep the AC thermostat at 81°F. Talking with colleagues who also received it, one said he turned off his home fan, and another reported that every time the governor got lathered up about emergency conservation he turned on another light at his house. It is

difficult to capture what people will do in response, if anything, making estimates of the impact of public emergency appeals very iffy.

I was curious if the blunt instrument of the OES appeal was more than the CAISO needed to get through the hours ending 1700 and 1800. If the sudden load reductions were greater than the real-time need, then one would expect real-time prices to fall. There were multiple ways to measure price and I'm not sure using the


OPR_DT	OPR_HR	LMP_TYPE	VALUE	OPR_INTERV
9/6/22	17	MCE	1209.1682	12
9/6/22	18	MCE	957.4537	1
9/6/22	18	MCE	862.76575	2
9/6/22	18	MCE	1048.9957	3
9/6/22	18	MCE	1128.9799	4
9/6/22	18	MCE	1320.2765	5
9/6/22	18	MCE	1349.4796	6
9/6/22	18	MCE	1458.6342	7
9/6/22	18	MCE	1734.3112	8
9/6/22	18	MCE	1734.0516	9
9/6/22	18	MCE	1730.7986	10
9/6/22	18	MCE	1728.2179	11

real-time system marginal energy absent losses and congestion costs was the best way, but that's what I did. To the left is a chart with the real-time marginal energy prices (\$/MWh in red) that trended downward for a few intervals after 17:55 and then popped back up above the soft bid cap eventually reaching a very stunning value of \$1,730-ish/MWh<sup>1</sup> during the last four intervals. On the base line comparison day of Wednesday, real time commodity prices were flat throughout the same twelve intervals, and of course much lower.

Seeking confirmation of my methodology to estimate the emergency load reduction response, I tapped Phil Muller who is my guru on computations of this nature. He sent me the analysis he provided to his clients in his September 12, 2022 [CAISO Update](#) and he told me, "Tuesday's hour ahead demand forecast relative to the actual demand in the designated demand response hours was 718 MW higher. On Wednesday the forecast error was 369 MW." Personally, I would take the delta in forecast errors between those two days as an indication of the OES impact although Phil didn't go there. But, I would say that our two independent calculations were close enough for government work.

Last Monday, WPTF held a video conference about the previous week's energy markets including presentations by Carrie Bentley from Gridwell Consulting, and Jeff Richter from Energy GPS. A recording of the presentations and the slide decks for each can be found by [clicking here](#). The material was voluminous and included many insights from two seasoned professionals. Truly outstanding work. Carrie noted many curious price formation occurrences the explanations for which can only be guessed. Her summary of these observations can be seen below, right. She also compared the real time demand to the different CEC forecasts.

It seems that demand exceeded even the forecasts for the least likely weather phenom, the one-in-twenty year midrange, as you can see on the left.



### Price formation initial observations

- Drivers of negative system market energy cost components (SMEC) during emergency conditions
  - Significant amount of exceptional dispatches
- Drivers of SMEC only reaching \$2,000/MWh in 15-minute market during EEA2
  - Pricing impacts of FMM export cuts, out of market actions
- Drivers of 5-minute prices continuing to come in below 15-minute prices
  - Demand response bidding and ability to set marginal prices, not co-optimizing A/S in the 5-minute market, lower load due to out of market and consumer actions

<sup>1</sup> My thanks to Kallie Wells of Gridwell Consulting for guiding me through the temperamental CAISO OASIS data. She didn't want to see a grown man cry. My attempts to repeat my wizardry using OASIS without her help were in vain. What does that tell you?


Forecast error is inescapable. Data points above a forecast either may indicate missing information or may be within a high confidence band around the forecast. Yet, Carrie's two observations bring to the fore important considerations.

**What we believe...**

1. Competition yields lower electricity rates.
2. Stable and transparent rules and regulations promote private investment.
3. Private investors, rather than utilities, will spend money on new power plants and transmission facilities if they can earn a return that is balanced with the risks.
4. Private sector investment results in lower average prices without risking consumers' money.

First, should the planning reserve margin (PRM) both for integrated resource planning and RA procurement be elevated? It's a costly move for load-serving entities that eventually is passed on to their customers but the risks of a future shortfall without such needs no further explanation. Second, although the CAISO has done much in the way of providing price transparency, more is needed. The algorithms determining prices sometimes produce unexpected results, but that is when market participants learn the most about price drivers, such as exceptional dispatches.

Below is an example of that last item regarding battery energy storage systems (BESS). I appreciate that the non-hybrid BESS fleet does a great job of responding to price signals, but in viewing the state-of-charge (SOC) curves for the fleet on both September 6 (left, below) and September 7 (right, below), if there was a lot of exceptional dispatch on the 7<sup>th</sup>, then I suppose it might be captured in the relative shapes of the two diurnal curves. The left is peakier whereas the right is flatter. The left SOC peaks at 1 p.m. whereas the next day the SOC reached its plateau around 12:30 and it held, sort of, until 17:20. The real time prices for those two days were different by a factor of ten, so I'm not sure if what I am showing is a result of exceptional dispatch or price response. I don't have a problem with either and there are occasions for the CAISO to allow one or the other. However, must we guess at the answer when there is so much data available?



diurnal curves. The left is peakier whereas the right is flatter. The left SOC peaks at 1 p.m. whereas the next day the SOC reached its plateau around 12:30 and it held, sort of, until 17:20. The real time prices for those two days were different by a factor of ten, so I'm not sure if what I am showing is a result of exceptional dispatch or price response. I don't have a problem with either and there are occasions for the CAISO to allow one or the other. However, must we guess at the answer when there is so much data available?

Enough about last week's exciting spectacle. Let's switch topics to GHG emissions around the globe, particularly in China.

The WSJ ran an **editorial board opinion piece on Monday** entitled, "China's Coal Power Boom." The money being spent in the U.S. to battle climate by reducing stationary emissions and electrifying transportation seem like a royal waste of time and money. The number of coal plants being erected in the Middle Kingdom or the Godly States, whichever name you choose for China, smothers the marginal reductions here. Per the WSJ: "Since China signed the Paris pact, its coal-fired power capacity has increased by some 185 gigawatts ... The U.S. has decreased its coal capacity by about 80 gigawatts since late 2015. Natural gas plants that emit less CO2 are replacing coal power in the U.S., which accounts for most of the decline in U.S. greenhouse-gas emissions." Add new coal plants in India, and Africa to China's growing fleet and you can sense the futility of claiming victory from tiny costly domestic emissions reductions. If you want to feel good about saving the planet, then take the most efficient path forward with the least amount of economic pain. Further, as the article notes,



“Chinese officials have also made clear that any concessions on climate will require U.S. concessions on Chinese priorities such as Taiwan, trade policy and human rights.” Now how much are we willing to pay?

In a separate [opinion piece in the WSJ that ran last week](#) regarding Europe instead of Asia, Joseph Sternberg points out that the economic cost of the EU climate goals are wreaking havoc. He wrote: “This has created an energy system of dangerous rigidity and inefficiency incapable of adapting to a blow such as Russia’s partial exit from the European gas market. It’s almost inevitable that the imminent result will be a recession in Europe. We can only hope that it won’t also trigger a global financial crisis.” Got it.

Let’s move from the planet to the kitchen. Here is Chef [Laura Manz](#) with her recipe for eggplant parmesan: “Weekends are the ideal time to experiment with new recipes, especially now that it’s cooled off enough to cook again. Beautiful eggplants of the season did not disappoint in this lovely layered lasagna. My baking pan held slightly less than a full pound of noodles. The extra pasta and sauce made wonderful roll-ups for a mid-week meal.”


Prepare the eggplant by peeling and dicing two eggplants. Toss in olive oil and spread evenly among 2 baking sheets. Bake at 375° for 25 minutes until tender.

While the eggplant is cooking, prepare a tomato sauce by heating 3 Tbsp. of olive oil over medium heat. When the oil is hot, sauté one large diced onion. When the onion becomes translucent, stir in 2 minced garlic cloves. Cook about two minutes then add two 28 oz. cans of San Marzano whole tomatoes, one bay leaf, 1 sprig of thyme (or 1 Tbsp. dried), 2 Tbsp. of dried basil, 1 tsp. of kosher salt and 1 tsp. of fresh ground pepper. Cook for about 20 minutes then reduce heat to low. Add eggplant and cook an additional 15 minutes.

Prepare a bechamel sauce by making a roux in a small saucepan over medium heat. Whisk together 4 Tbsp. of melted butter with ¼ cup of flour and cook until the mixture turns slightly brown. Turn off the heat and slowly add 3 cups of whole milk, whisking continuously until the mixture is thickened. Add 2 tsp. of salt and ½ tsp. of grated nutmeg.

Bring a pot of well-salted water to a rolling boil. Working in batches, cook up to 1 lb. lasagna noodles for 6 minutes. Plunge into an ice bath to hold for assembly.

Grate 1 cup of Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. Place the ingredients into your work area.



*Simply*  
*Suedeem*

[Click here to learn more about Suedeem Kelly](#)

*Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided an interesting case, issuing a fun-to-read opinion, that just might go to the U.S. Supreme Court. NextEra sued the Texas Public Utility Commission for denying its request to build a new transmission line because Texas had passed a law barring “new entrants” from building transmission lines. NextEra had not previously built transmission in Texas, thus was a “new entrant.” NextEra challenged the law re-establishing an incumbent utility’s preemptive right to build new transmission (a “right of first refusal” or ROFR), arguing the ROFR runs afoul of the Constitution’s ban on undue burdens on interstate commerce. The Fifth Circuit agreed.*

*The Court’s opinion begins by asking the reader to “imagine if Texas—a state that prides itself on promoting free enterprise—passed a law saying that only those with existing oil wells in the state could drill new wells.” Answer: you can’t. So, how could Texas legislate that “if a company had not built transmission lines in Texas before 2019, it can never build such lines.” The Court said, it can’t: “Once we wade through the thicket of electricity regulation, the ban’s interference with interstate commerce becomes as clear as it is for the oil well hypothetical.” In between, the Court discusses other outlawed state protectionist measures, including retail wine stores, local dairies, and liquor stores. In the end, the Court finds “what is true for alcohol and milk under the dormant Commerce Clause must be true for electricity.”*

*This, however, conflicts with a 2020 decision by the Eighth Circuit upholding Minnesota’s ROFR law, holding that “Minnesota’s interest in regulating its own local electricity market outweighs any incidental effects on interstate commerce.” If the Supreme Court takes on these cases, which narrative will prevail? Does ROFR legislation empower needed local utility market regulation or hobble needed competition?*

Assemble the lasagna into a 9"x13" pan by layering sauce, pasta, bechamel and cheese. Continue this layering until the pan is full and bechamel + cheese is the final layer. Bake at 375° for 45 minutes until the edges are golden brown. Rest about 15 minutes before serving.

Bravo, Laura. That sounds like it would beat by a mile the eggplant parmesan that I buy at a local Italian deli. Wow. Hmm. BTW would-be cooks of Laura's recipe, don't chintz on the Parmigiano-Reggiano cheese. Get one that's a good quality and not too salty. It makes a difference.

Here's your panned noodles for this week:

>>> Things in the People's Republic of California  
@@@ CPUC Energy Division Staff Paper on IRP Procurement is Exceptionally Insightful

>>> Shout Outs and Murmurs (👁️ & 🧠)

>>> Odds & Ends (!\_)

---

>>> Things in the People's Republic of California  
@@@ CPUC Energy Division Staff Paper on IRP Procurement is Exceptionally Insightful

When WPTF's CPUC consultant, Gregg Klatt, reviewed last week's Cappuccino **Order regarding IRP procurement** it was an eye opener to be sure. Sometimes necessity is the mother of invention, and other times necessity is just a mother. The Order focused on the **Energy Division paper** entitled, "Reliable and Clean Power Procurement Program: Staff Options Paper." The 42-page endeavor is more than just a list of ideas for future California load serving entity (LSE) procurement. Much more. I found the opening salvo remarkably effective in summarizing where the state has been with long-term procurement, what factors and situations have changed, and some potential solutions. In other words, it's a very holistic approach that deserves congratulations. It doesn't answer the tough question about which paradigm will encourage long-term procurement of reliability and clean energy resources ... at least not yet, but it is a benchmark treatise regarding the topic.

Let me start where the staff paper starts and I'll abbreviate the text a la Burrito assuming you folks are somewhat up to speed on our industry's jargon.

The Cappuccino's regulation of electricity markets consists of four programs:

1. Resource Adequacy (RA) ... ensures that such capacity has a must-offer obligation to bid into the CAISO markets.
2. The IRP process establishes long-term planning goals for new resource needs to meet reliability requirements and GHG-reduction targets.
3. The Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) program.
4. Demand-side resources.

That summary alone is worth the price of admission. The list succinctly establishes the reach of the CPUC so that as one hops across the four topics with reckless abandon here is a solid construct of where the discussion comes under the CPUC's authority. I wish I had that list years ago. But, we must move on.

#### **What we believe... (cont.)**

5. However, when IOUs do the investing, the risks to them are minimal or non-existent because ratepayers cover all the costs.
- 6) Overcapacity lowers electricity spot market prices; yet retail rates can increase in this case due to full cost-of-service regulation.
- 7) Markets work best when there are many buyers and sellers.
- 8) At-risk money will be put to investment where markets exist that are well regulated and yield credible prices.

---

September 16, 2022

Page 5 of 9

Key market fundamentals have been changing. Staff observed three overarching trends:

1. Increased role of Community Choice Aggregators (CCAs)
2. Increased capacity market tightness
3. Increasingly ambitious GHG-reduction goals

The staff paper advances the idea that one-off procurement orders have shortcomings that need to be addressed using a programmatic approach. The Order states: “Ideally, an adopted programmatic approach to procurement would obviate the need for individual orders... and replace them with an ongoing obligation for each load-serving entity (LSE) to procure enough resources to meet its share of reliability and GHG-reduction requirements.” That makes sense.

Regarding its procurement program recommendations, Gregg Klatt did a nice summary from which the following comments are excerpted. The new IRP would have four basic elements:

1. Need determination based on modeling.
2. Need allocation for each LSE considering load migration and the LSE’s existing portfolio.
3. Compliance; and,
4. Enforcement: Penalties and/or backstop procurement mechanisms.

Gregg noted that, “LSEs could be required to procure not only incremental capacity (MW) from new clean energy resources ... but also—or alternatively—specified quantities of clean energy (MWh). If the Commission ultimately goes that route (i.e., imposing firm clean energy procurement requirements on LSEs), it would be a massive expansion of the Commission’s regulation and oversight of individual LSE procurement activities.”

**... and, what we should do:**

1. Believe in ourselves.
2. Encourage creation of independent, multi-state regional transmission organizations that coordinate policies with respective state utility commissions.
3. Support rules for resource adequacy that applies uniformly among all load-serving entities.
4. Enforce competitive solicitations by utilities for purchasing either thermal or renewable power.

Additionally, staff advances the idea of requiring the IRP procurement to be conducted via centralized auctions or standard offer processes. Centralized auctions have been proposed in the past without gaining much traction. Maybe this next round will provide the necessity to get these items developed.

The staff discussion on forward compliance does a good job describing the possibilities: “Once each LSE’s need is established, as well as the method for counting resources against that need, then the LSE needs to know what the

CPUC expects for forward contracting relative to the need. The following are key components of defining a forward compliance requirement:

- Years covered: As an example, upon program start-up, the first year of coverage could start 5 years ahead, and the last year of coverage could be 10 years ahead. In this case, if the LSE is filing in year 2024, it would need to show some amount of forward contracting for the years 2029-2034 ... Compliance would be based on the rolling 10-year-ahead period. As an alternative, to avoid overlapping with RA program showings, there could be some form of conversion of need and compliance requirements at around the 3-year-ahead mark.
- Volume of need covered in each year: For each year covered, the CPUC will need to define what fraction of LSE reliability need must be met by resources under contract. For example, 100 percent of the 5-year-ahead LSE need could be required to be under contract, declining to 25 percent of LSE need 10 years ahead. Continuing with the same example, by 2028 the LSE is showing 100% of its need is covered through 2033, declining to 25 percent of its need in 2038.

- Proof of contracting: The CPUC will need to specify how LSEs will demonstrate that they have executed the requisite contracts.
- Persistence of the attributes: The effectiveness of the program may be undermined if the new resources that are committed via forward contracts to provide the necessary attributes to the CAISO system are able to serve other balancing areas after coming off contract.
- Frequency of compliance filings: Compliance filings could be annual ... More frequent filings increase the administrative burden for the CPUC and LSEs, but adapt more quickly to LSE load migration and changing system conditions."

I'd be interested in hearing from staff people in states other than California about the measures above and how they may play in different jurisdictions. It's a lot of stuff to consider that lacking a regulatory staff large enough to handle a procurement program, how do neighboring states intend to satisfy their respective reliability and environmental goals? Is there really a simpler way such as trust the local utility(ies) to develop an IRP and the regulator can give it a pass/fail grade?

The procedural schedule set forth by ALJ Fitch invites comments on the staff paper by November 7 and reply comments by November 28. Overall, I think this was a job well done.


>>> Shout Outs and Murmurs (👁️ & 🗣️)

A couple of letters this week. First, Glen Casanova replied to last week's inquiry by Bob Hoffman seeking an explanation of why future price indices have off-peak prices escalating above on-peak prices: "Peak hours increasingly become saturated with solar generation thereby reducing the average. However, the inter-period volatility dramatically increases. In effect the 'on-peak price', while likely to remain a trading reference and an accurate reflection of an average, doesn't provide the true picture of price during that period. As an example, let's pick a beautiful Spring day in April. The Peak average is \$36/MWh, the average during the solar hours is \$1.75/MWh, and the average during the balance of hours is \$75/MWh."

Sounds reasonable.

Here's an anonymous note on the CAISO battery fleet performance last week. "Batteries should be allowed to bid their *opportunity cost* into CAISO, even if it's above the soft bid cap. Below is a figure from the CAISO Outlook data similar to what you showed in the last Burrito.

"A few things that are going on. First, notice the midday dispatch on the 6th, and then the differences for the 5th and the 7th. There are a few dynamics going on here that I wanted to draw your attention to. The 5th was a quieter day for load and thus the price front, and there was ideal economic dispatch moving into peak/net-peak as we would expect in a well-functioning market (read little to no Exceptional Dispatches (ED)). On the 6th prices went above the soft bid cap early afternoon and batteries were economically dispatched because they cannot bid above the soft bid cap, and thus the market arguably dispatched batteries prematurely. As a result you see on the 7th batteries were not dispatched until the peak/net-peak (despite prices), and this is likely coming from exceptional dispatches, from which the operators learned their lesson on the 6th. The batteries





were dec'd all afternoon to hold their SOC till peak/net-peak. One last little note, any EDs will lead to bid cost recovery, and so the price spreads from bid-cost recovery due to an ED may not be a bad thing for BESS resources.

“The larger point I think that's worth making is that batteries should be bidding their *opportunity cost*, and as such CAISO should allow them to bid above the soft bid cap when market conditions head in that direction. That will avoid EDs, which we should all welcome, and then also allow for batteries to operate as they should and create the correct incentives for investment.”

Interesting note that triggers many questions such as, why should batteries alone be allowed to bid opportunity cost? What about gas-fired resources? What's good for the goose should be good for the gander.

**... and, what we should do:**

5. Support choice among retail electricity customers.
6. Lobby for core/non-core split of retail customers.
7. Advocate against policies that limit, through bid mitigation, merchant returns on investment that are utility-like returns.

Last letter is from Joey Baranski who wrote: “You probably know this, but EEA levels are defined in NERC Reliability Standard EOP-011, noting that the EEA3 split into 2 parts doesn't align with the standard.”

True, but in further emails between Joey and me, we agreed that the CAISO exceeded the NERC standard and that's okay. Standards set the minimum allowable requirement, not the upper limit.

Murmur #1: The CAISO is actively exploring subscription-based transmission elements that interconnect resources in

other states into the CAISO without adding to the Transmission Access Charge (TAC). It seems like a good idea. Not all the rate-setting details have been established but it is front and center for at least one transmission project that has been in development for over a decade, the TransWest Express. In a **July press release**, the company stated: “TransWest Express LLC has submitted an application to the CAISO under which the CAISO would operate the ... Transmission Project as part of its long-distance, high-voltage transmission system network. The TWE Project is a 732-mile high-voltage interregional transmission system with HVDC and HVAC segments that will connect to the existing grid in Wyoming and Utah as well as directly to the CAISO Controlled Grid in southern Nevada. Under a proposed contractual arrangement, TransWest would become the CAISO's first Subscriber Participating Transmission Owner, or SPTO. TransWest would continue to derive revenues for long-term firm transmission service from its subscribers and for other transmission services under a separate wheeling charge.” That's damn exciting and prospectively puts a CAISO foothold in the Rocky Mountain states ... interesting possibilities for the future day-ahead market platform of the CAISO.

Murmur #2: Given Washington State's newly enacted GHG cap-and-trade program starting next January, will trading at Mid-C become increasingly complex? Will it spell the demise of the trading hub? Will future day-ahead market platforms such as EDAM and Markets+ hobble the hub? WSPP is actively discussing two separate trading products for its Schedule C: one for physical deliveries sinking to load in Washington State and subject to the GHG payment obligation, and those sinking to load in neighboring states that do not need to pay that fee. A shift to bilateral trades and away from using Mid-C has already begun and promises to grow as the Washington State program takes hold. Of course, I recall that when the CAISO first launched its LMP-based market in 2009 that the same claim was made about ICE liquidity at SP15 and NP15 ... that is, ICE would be rendered irrelevant. None of that happened because the price formation results for the CAISO were undependable, unexplainable, and generally not trusted. The good folks who are part of the WSPP Operating Committee have been and will be discussing this matter at their upcoming meeting in Palm Springs.



---

September 16, 2022

Page 8 of 9



>>> Odds & Ends (!\_)

We made it. Another week, another set of issues, and a blessed weekend coming up. Here are your stories:

### **Email from Mom**

John invited his mother over for dinner. During the meal, his mother couldn't help noticing how beautiful John's roommate was. She had long been suspicious of a relationship between John and his roommate and this only made her more curious.

Over the course of the evening, while watching the two interact, she started to wonder if there was more between John and the roommate than met the eye. Reading his mom's thoughts, John volunteered, "I know what you must be thinking, but I assure you, Julie and I are just roommates."

About a week later, Julie came to John and said, "Ever since your mother came to dinner, I've been unable to find the beautiful silver gravy ladle. You don't suppose she took it, do you?"

John said, "Well, I doubt it but I'll write her an email just to be sure."

So he sat down and wrote, "Dear Mother, I'm not saying you did take a gravy ladle from my house and I'm not saying you did not take it. But the fact remains that it has been missing ever since you were here for dinner."

A few days later John received an email from his mother which read, "Dear Son, I'm not saying that you do sleep with Julie and I'm not saying that you do not sleep with her. But the fact remains that if she were sleeping in her own bed, she would have found the gravy ladle by now."

### **A Toast**

John O'Reilly hoisted his beer and said, "Here's to spending the rest of me Life, between the legs of me wife!"

That won him the top prize at the pub for the best toast of the night!

He went home and told his wife, Mary, "I won the prize for the Best toast of the night."

She said, "Aye, did ye now. And what was your toast?"

John said, "Here's to spending the rest of me life, sitting in church beside me wife."

"Oh, that is very nice indeed, John!" Mary said.

The next day, Mary ran into one of John's drinking buddies on the street corner. The man chuckled leeringly and said, "John won the prize the other night at the pub with a toast about you, Mary."

She said, "Aye, he told me, and I was a bit surprised myself. You know, he's only been in there twice in the last four years. Once I had to pull him by the ears to make him come and the other time he fell asleep."

---

That's all I have for you, a couple of recycled old stories. Have a great weekend and we will begin the fall season on Friday next.

gba